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Water markets have been seen as an effective way of addressing water scarcity and 
allocation issues. In this paper we discuss the role and characteristics of water 
markets in facilitating efficient water allocation.  Administrative, regulatory and/or 
political barriers to effective functioning of water markets are reviewed with a focus 
on southern Murray-Darling Basin in Australia.  A mathematical model is developed 
to estimate the costs of existing restrictions and the benefits from potential changes 
in the water markets (eg. removing barriers in temporary water market).  The 
modelling results reveal that when expanding trade from intraregional only to 
interregional trade, mean annual net returns increased from $2,502 million
5 to 
$2,590 million (i.e. an increase of $88 million).  When the current volume restrictions, 
exchange rates, and trading charges are in place, mean annual net returns reduced 
from $2,590 million to $2,573 million (i.e. a reduction of $17 million).  The exclusion 
of any state from the interstate water trading market imposes significant costs.  If 
South Australia, New South Wales or Victoria withdraws from the market, it reduces 
net returns by $27 million, $31 million and $63 million, respectively, from water 
trading.  In conclusion, the policy implications on strategies to removing market 
barriers are outlined to facilitate efficient and effective water trading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Water is increasingly becoming a scarce resource that is limiting agricultural 
development in many parts of the world.  Like in many other countries, irrigation is a 
major water user in Australia and has allowed the expansion of agriculture across 
the country to help increase and stabilise the revenue from farming.  However, there 
has been increasing concern over irrigation water over-allocation in certain regions 
of Australia.  There has also been concern that climate change may reduce irrigation 
water allocations.  Further, there has also been concern that these activities affect 
water quality and impose external costs on downstream users.  Nowadays, many 
river systems are facing multiple threats, including changes to flow regime, habitat 
destruction, increased salt and sediment load, loss of connectivity due to structural 
alterations, and introduction of exotic species.  For example, the River Murray’s 
median annual flow to the sea is now only 27% of the natural (pre-development) flow 
(MDBC, 2001). 
Of these threats, changes to flow regime are critical and require immediate 
action if these rivers are to be returned to a ‘healthy working river’ condition for 
current and future generations (CRCFE, 2003).  A new approach to water allocation 
is therefore required if agricultural productivity level is to be maintained without 
further degradation of ecosystem services.  Policy makers have a range of 
instruments to provide incentives to irrigators for better land and water management 
practices.  In particular, water markets are thought to provide more incentives for 
efficient allocation, as opposed to administrative mechanisms (Calatrava and 
Garrido, 2005).  Researchers (eg. Easter et al., 1999; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994) argue that water markets provide a flexible and efficient way to allocate water 
while at the same time providing incentives that are beneficial for water users.  Like 
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many other countries around the world, Australian Commonwealth and state 
governments have agreed to develop and implement a range of policies, including 
the use of market based instruments (eg. water trading, subsidies, water pricing), to 
maximise economic gains from agricultural activities while minimising impact on 
natural resources and the environment.  
One rationale for water reforms is that some of the water could be used more 
productively than it is in its current use through water markets and trade.  It is 
generally believed that transition towards trading through water markets is likely to 
increase and improve economic efficiency (Brill et al., 1997).  For instance, because 
market prices make the opportunity cost of water explicit to users, markets provide 
incentives to adopt water-saving technologies (Calatrava and Garrido, 2005).  The 
gains in efficiency largely result from the expansion of water use by highly efficient 
new water users, adoption of water conserving technologies and elimination of 
inefficient uses of water (Zilberman and Schoengold, 2005).  Moreover, it is believed 
that removing impediments to trade will allow the opportunity cost of water to 
become evident and may create opportunities for more productive uses.  Therefore, 
understanding the economic value of irrigation water is essential to make better use 
of irrigation water across agricultural activities and regions, maximise water 
productivity through efficient allocation, and for any future agricultural development 
and water policy change.  Meanwhile, policy makers are interested in the costs of 
water trade restrictions and the benefits from lifting these restrictions as well as its 
potential positive and negative regional and sectoral impacts.  
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CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF WATER MARKETS 
Water Rights and Water Markets 
With growing scarcity and increasing competition for water across sectors, the need 
for efficient, equitable, and sustainable water allocation policies has been put on the 
top of the agenda of water resource management worldwide.  Among other things, 
water markets provide better incentives for efficient allocation compared with 
administrative allocative mechanisms (eg. land-bounded water rights system), 
proactive strategies (eg. stimulating more efficient irrigation technologies) or reactive 
responses (eg. compensatory schemes).  
Water markets (or water trading) require that water rights be clearly defined 
and the mechanisms to facilitate and monitor trades established.  The way property 
rights are defined will structure the incentives and disincentives which members of 
society face in their decisions regarding water ownership, use and transfer.   
Similarly, a well defined set of rules is necessary to permit market transactions to 
take place (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998).  Well defined water property rights and market 
prices can effectively allocate scarce water among irrigators, industries and 
households (Freebairn, 2003).  In a water market, water is allocated at a price set by 
the free exchange of some type of property right to the use of water either for a 
limited time (a lease or seasonal allocation) or in perpetuity (a sale or permanent 
transfer of entitlement).  In fact, it is the interactions between the buyers and sellers 
of rights that comprise a water market (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998).  
Progress of Water Markets 
Numerous informal and formal markets have existed in both developing and 
developed countries of the world for many years.  In formal markets, water rights are 
clearly and universally assigned, with legal validity for freely negotiated sale of these 
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rights.  In informal markets, there is neither clear assignment of rights nor legal 
sanction to trade.  Informal markets operate for volume of water while formal markets 
are generally defined with respect to water rights
6 (Mohanty and Gupta, 2002).   
Informal water markets are widespread in South Asia (Pakistan Water and Power 
Development Authority, 1990; Shah, 1991).  Such markets were widespread in 
Mexico even before the introduction of formal tradeable water rights (Easter et al., 
1997).  Several governments have established legal tradeable water rights in an 
attempt to retain and extend the advantage of informal water markets while reducing 
some of the negative costs associated with illegal status (Easter et al., 1997).   
Western United States is one of the earliest places where formal water markets were 
proposed to alleviate water shortages.  Chile and Mexico are the only countries that 
have established formal regimes of tradeable water rights at the national level.  
In Australia, water markets have been promoted as a preferred instrument to 
reallocate scarce water resources since 1970s.  In the 1990s, policy makers became 
serious in promoting markets as a preferred mechanism to reallocate water between 
competing users (Bjornlund, 2006).  The states allowed transferring of water rights 
(or entitlements) through markets in the late 1980s.  Before that, water entitlements 
were tied to the land on which the water could be used but could not be transferred 
separately from the land.  Over the past decade, this link has gradually and 
progressively been broken, allowing water to be traded as an asset separate to land, 
enabling it to move to higher-value uses (ACIL Tasman, 2004).  The last decade has 
also witnessed significant progress in the development of water markets as a key 
                                                 
6  One prerequisite for water marketing is some type of water or use right that can be bought or sold 
separately from ownership of the land.  Giving users water rights means that water managers have 
the responsibility to deliver water more or less when the users need it (Easter et al., 1997). 
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instrument in achieving the objective of more efficient and sustainable use of water 
resources (Young et al., 2000, 2006a; Shi, 2005, 2006).  
Performance of Water Markets 
Water markets have made significant contributions to many regional and national 
economies.  In Chile, the existence of secure property rights in water resources has 
made a noticeable contribution to the overall growth in the value of the country’s 
agricultural production since 1980.  In Spain, there is evidence that the market 
approach has been efficient in terms of net increases in the regional income (Lee 
and Jouravlev, 1998).  In Australia, water trading has raised the value of water use in 
the basin and enhanced its contribution to the economy (Young et al., 2000; 
Peterson et al., 2004).  Gains from water trading increase as water scarcity 
increases, thus increasing the marginal value of a unit of water (Zilberman and 
Schoengold, 2005).  Greater gains of water trading are possible when there is great 
variation in the values of different agricultural activities and regions. 
However, it is important to recognise that water use might increase with any 
water reform that allows trading due to the fact that the added demand by new water 
users may be greater than the reduction in demand of existing water users 
(Zilberman and Schoengold, 2005).  When deciding whether to introduce a reform 
that allows water trading, the efficiency gains from trading must be weighed against 
the transaction and capital costs required by the reform.  Also, it is important to 
account for both positive and negative externalities as a result of water trading.   
Studies conducted in various countries have estimated economic losses resulting 
from being unable to bring market-based reallocation of water from lower to higher 
value uses (eg. Lee and Jouravlev, 1998; Young et al., 2000, 2006b; Peterson et al., 
2004; Qureshi et al., 2007).  These losses or unrealised benefits of water marketing 
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assure great opportunity costs of failing to modify existing water institutions that will 
promote efficient use of scarce water resources (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998).  
Despite significant progress in water markets and gains as a result of water 
trading, there are still barriers in establishing properly functioning water markets 
worldwide.  Though many of these barriers are applicable to permanent trading only, 
they do have implications for temporary and interstate trading.  Therefore, there is a 
need to identify the different kinds of barriers a trading regime faces in a particular 
region or country and estimate the costs of these barriers.  In this study, the southern 
Murray Darling Basin was selected as the case study area to examine in detail the 
water trading regime, barriers and economic implications for specific irrigation 
regions.  
WATER MARKETS IN THE MURRAY DARLING BASIN 
Murray Darling Basin and Water Allocation Issues  
The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) is Australia’s most significant river system.  It 
includes the nation’s three longest rivers - the Darling (2,740km), the Murray 
(2,530km) and the Murrumbidgee (1,690km) (see Figure 1a and 1b).  The Basin 
covers 14% of Australia’s total area and is home to some 10% of Australia’s 
population.  It is Australia’s most important agricultural region, accounting for around 
41% of the nation's gross value of agricultural production.  The Basin supports 
almost one third of the nation's cattle herd, half of the sheep flock, half of the crop 
land and almost three-quarters of the nation’s irrigated land.  Around 70% of all 
water used for agriculture in Australia is used by irrigation in the Basin (ABS, 1997). 
FIGURE 1a ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 1b ABOUT HERE 
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Over the last 20 years, there has been significant expansion in the areas of 
agricultural activities, including crops and pasture associated with irrigation 
development.  In the early 1980s, irrigation water use was about 9000 GL, while in 
recent years it has exceeded 12000 GL for the whole MDB (Dunlop et al., 2002).  
Changes to land use and river management in the Basin have increased pressure on 
the Basin's resources, and concern over water quality and ecosystem health (MDBC, 
2001). 
Water markets have been developed as one of the key water demand 
management strategies.  However, the extent of actual trades on a permanent basis 
has been relatively modest (see Figure 2).  For example, in states like New South 
Wales (NSW) and Victoria, annual permanent trade is commonly of the order of less 
than 1% of total entitlements.  In contrast, temporary trade has grown significantly to 
represent as much as 10-20% of allocations
7 (Peterson et al., 2004).  The 
widespread uptake of temporary trade is also evidenced by the public water 
exchanges
8 that now exist to facilitate exchange in seasonal water allocations by 
providing a public notice board, and sometimes a clearing house, for such trades.  
These water exchanges bring buyers and sellers together on a regular basis and 
thereby reduce the extent of potential asymmetry in bargaining power between 
market participants (Bell and Blias, 2002).  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
7  Trade in water entitlements or permanent trade is the transfer of the ongoing right to access water 
for the term of the right.  Trade in seasonal water allocations or temporary transfer is the transfer of 
some or all of the water allocated in accordance with the entitlement for the current irrigation season 
or for an agreed period of time.  
8  The largest of these public clearing houses is Watermove, which began as the Northern Water 
Exchange that covered temporary trade in the large irrigation districts on the Victorian side of the 
Murray, and the Goulburn Valley, its major Victorian tributary.  
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However, the volume of net interregional trade (‘trade-out’ minus ‘trade-in’) in 
seasonal allocations remains small and varies across irrigation districts from year-to-
year (Heaney et al., 2005).  Despite significant progress of water markets in the 
southern part of MDB, there are a number of barriers that inhibit proper functioning of 
water markets (Shi, 2005, 2006). These barriers are briefly described below. 
Administrative and Regulatory Variation 
In addition to variation in allocation of water access rights and level of water security 
in the three states of the southern MDB, there is variation in the management 
regimes of different irrigation authorities.  In the NSW southern MDB, there are three 
main irrigation water providers (i.e. Murrumbidgee Irrigation Limited, Coleambally 
Irrigation Co-operative and Murray Irrigation) (Heaney et al., 2004).  In Victoria, there 
are five main water providers.  Each is a statutory authority with sole responsibility to 
deliver water to its customers holding water entitlements.  Among them, Goulburn-
Murray Water accounts for 90% of all entitlements used for irrigation (NCC, 2003).  
In South Australia (SA), most irrigation water is managed by three irrigation trusts, 
namely Central Irrigation Trust, Renmark Irrigation Trust and Sunlands Irrigation 
Trust Inc. (Heaney et al., 2004). 
Trading water within and between irrigation districts has been constrained by 
administrative and regulatory arrangements.  These restrictions appear to be 
imposed for a variety of reasons including: hydrological limitations to water 
movement
9; environmental impacts of changing the current patterns of the supply 
                                                 
9  The most significant river channel constraints on the River Murray is the Barmah Choke, through 
which the flow capacity is reduced to around 8500 ML per day to prevent flooding of the surrounding 
red gum forest.  As a result, downstream trades are only possible if they are offset by upstream 
trades. 
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and use of water; concerns of stranded assets
10; and social and economic 
adjustment costs associated with water being exported from particular districts 
(Peterson et al., 2004).  Many of these restrictions have been imposed to simply 
retain water within an irrigation system.  For example, the Central Irrigation Trust in 
SA has put a 2% cumulative limit on permanent entitlement trade out of the Trust’s 
districts in an attempt to protect regional interests.  Excessive water allocation is 
seen as an incentive for future investment in the regions (Goesch, 2001). 
At a state level, water authorities in Victoria can refuse permanent trade out of 
an area if annual net transfers exceed 4% of water rights in that area.  Further, 
Victoria may ban interstate temporary trade following the end of the irrigation 
season.  This measure is designed to prevent temporary transfers of unused water 
from Victoria to NSW at a low cost later in the irrigation season.  Such a transfer may 
reduce water availability in Victoria in the following season or result in the water 
being introduced at higher prices by speculators during the peak demand period of 
the following season (Bell and Blias, 2002).  
Financial Cost Variation 
Another reason for less interregional water trading is variation in water charges by 
different irrigation water providers.  Generally, irrigators face a two-part tariff 
comprising a fixed access fee and a variable consumption charge based on the 
volume of water delivered.  There is considerable variation between regions in the 
proportion of fixed and variable charges.  In regions where fixed charges are an 
excessively large component of delivery charges, they may distort trading patterns 
by moving an irrigator out of business. On the other hand, in the regions where 
delivery charges are based mainly on the variable component, it is likely that these 
                                                 
10  A situation where an irrigation authority is faced with large fixed infrastructure costs and a declining 
customer base.   
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fees include the costs directly associated with the volume of water delivered as well 
as a significant share of the capital and overhead costs of delivery (Goesch, 2001; 
Heaney et al., 2004).  Further, the fixed fee tends to be collected through an annual 
access fee.  In both cases, irrigators are not liable for outstanding fixed costs when 
water is traded out of the system, leaving those remaining to face higher charges.  
Depending on the outcomes from interregional trade, the way in which the supply 
authority recoups its revenue differential could have a significant impact on regional 
income and further distort trading patterns (Goesch, 2001).  
The costs associated with temporary water trades include state government, 
agency, water authority fees or agent commission.  The costs associated with 
temporary water trades for SA, NSW and Victoria include application fees, technical 
assessment fees and other charges.  For example, the application fees for 
temporary water trades in SA are larger than the other two states.  The application 
fee for NSW and Victoria is up to $75 while the same fee for SA is up to $300 along 
with the local irrigation authority or trust fee.  In the case of interstate trade, sellers 
are required to pay the transfer fees set by the selling authority which vary between 
$65 and $75.  
Other Constraints in Trade  
The NSW Water Allocation Plan 2003-04 provided a restriction on temporary 
(annual) trades between the valleys of the Murray and the Murrumbidgee Rivers at 
the start of the 2003-04 seasons due to low water availability (DIPNR, 2003).  This 
restriction was later relaxed in 2005 when there was a significant improvement in 
water availability.  In Victoria, transfers to NSW are not allowed after February each 
year.  Goulburn-Murray Water tends to replicate the regulation for water entitlements 
in its rules for temporary trade.  In the Goulburn-Murray Water system, trading is 
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prohibited between certain subdistricts within an irrigation district and from certain 
trading districts within an irrigation district to other irrigation districts.  As far as intra-
district trading is concerned, only first 30% of ‘sales water’ can be traded which 
forfeits access to all ‘sales’ water above 30% (Peterson et al 2004).   
Trade does not always result in gains, especially when negative externalities 
are considered.  The externalities or third party effects can be of particular concern if 
the water market comprises a significant reallocation mechanism for water 
resources.  The Murray Darling Basin Commission has established an exchange 
rate
11 among states to deal with the third party impact issues.  The application of an 
exchange rate enables the volume and reliability characteristics of the water 
entitlement to be converted from those of the seller’s state to those of the buyer’s 
state, including accounting for losses incurred in delivering the water.  Thus, the 
capacity of the lower river to continue to dilute the salinity will be protected (Young et 
al., 2000).  
MODELLING FRAMEWORK  
The focus of this analysis is on temporary trading, therefore only the relevant spatial, 
administrative constraints and financial barriers (disincentives) are considered in this 
paper.  The costs of these constraints and disincentives are estimated for each 
catchment in the MDB by extending a modelling framework developed to estimate 
the value of irrigation water across the southern MDB and estimating cost of 
                                                 
11  For example, trades from upstream diverters from NSW to Victoria and from Victoria to SA have a 
1.0 exchange rate, which means that 100% of the entitlement can be transferred down-stream.  But 
transfers from SA to the upstream states of Victoria and NSW have an exchange rate of 0.9 so that 
only 90% of the entitlement can be transferred.  Exchange rate can be asymmetrical even within the 
same irrigation system.  For example, an irrigator in the Murray Irrigation district (subdistrict 10B) who 
purchases 1 megalitre from an irrigator in the Hume-to-Barmah (NSW) subdistrict (10A) will only 
receive 0.85 ML.  On the contrary, if irrigators of 10A subdistrict were to sell 1 megalitre to 10B 
subdistrict, then the recipient would receive 1 ML (Peterson et al 2004).      
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environmental flows (Qureshi et al., 2007).  A summary of the modelling framework 
is as follows.  
Five states of nature have been used to reflect the overall temporal pattern of 
water availability for consumptive uses in the different regions of the Basin.  In 
calculating water supply across these states of nature, administrative water 
allocation rules are taken into account allowing for the system capacity to be stored 
and, hence, shifted towards drier years.  Historical rainfall data reveals that in 
extreme low rainfall cases, regions received about 35 per cent less rainfall than an 
average year rainfall while in a slightly better year, regions receive 25 per cent less.  
The expected rainfall value is used for each region across the Basin.  The spatial 
distribution of water allocations were calculated from a combination of the changed 
MDBC simulation runs and information from Bryan and Marvanek (2004).  Since the 
MDBC estimates provide the allocation at each diversion point, the analysis by Bryan 
and Marvanek (2004) is used to characterise differences in water demand related to 
evapotranspiration and effective rainfall across regions and years.  The result is a 
cumulative distribution of allocations for these catchments that was plotted and the 
10, 30, 50, 70 and 90 percentile points of the distribution calculated.  
The expected allocations for the whole Basin were compared with actual 
usage of water for irrigation in catchments of the southern MDB and it was found 
these allocations are higher than the actual usage data which was close to the 10
th 
percentile.  For consistency and for estimating financial returns and the true value of 
irrigation water, expected values were multiplied by the allocations at the various 
percentile points on the distribution by a factor which resulted in values that were 
approximately equal to the actual water usage plus an allowance for the channel 
conveyance losses for each catchment.  Hence, approximate values of irrigation 
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water use for several points on a frequency distribution were obtained.  It is to be 
noted that this frequency distribution is based on the assumption that the frequency 
distribution of water use is equal to the frequency distribution of water allocation for 
all catchments and for all years (including droughts and wet periods).  Net on-farm 
water available for irrigation is estimated after deducting conveyance losses and use 
in the analysis. 
The overall objective of this irrigation water demand (optimisation) model is to 
maximise the expected mean annual net return from water use for regional irrigation 
areas subject to a number of land, water and agronomic constraints.  Each region is 
treated as though it were a decision maker attempting to maximise economic returns 
from producing irrigated crops and releasing land for dryland activity if it is more 
profitable to sell water on temporary intra-regional water markets.  Stochastic water 
availability, effective rain and irrigation requirements are treated as states of nature 
and weighted by probabilities as derived from historical observations.  These states 
are included in the model to understand how irrigators will respond when they face 
extreme weather conditions.  The model estimates expected values of these 
variables accounting for risk involved in the agricultural activities.  
The expected mean annual net return from all regions for each state of nature 
is equal to the aggregate revenue from these regions minus variable costs, water 
supply costs and water charges.  The expected mean annual net return from these 
regions is obtained by weighting the net returns from these regions by their 
probabilities in each state of nature and aggregating to get total expected net returns 
from the Basin.  
Conceptually, an irrigator can improve application efficiency by using deficit 
irrigation, moving water from low value to high value irrigation activities, substituting 
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capital for water, or ultimately, by withdrawing irrigation and leaving land for dryland 
production.  Deficit irrigation (an irrigation scheduling technique) has been adopted in 
a number of agricultural activities in Australia.  For example, in grapes, water deficit 
is applied during the post-set period to minimise competition between ripening 
berries and vegetative growth (McCarthy, 2000).  Mainuddin et al. (1997) showed 
that in the case of lower availability of water, deficit irrigation can increase the overall 
net benefit.  The current model allows deficit irrigation subject to a certain threshold 
of minimum water requirements for each agricultural activity.  For example, rice 
cannot be grown if the irrigation water is less than 80% of its maximum 
evapotranspiration requirement.  
Temporary activities are allowed to take land from other temporary activities if 
it is economically viable to expand.  The permanent activities can only decrease 
water use through deficit irrigation and producing less than their maximum potential 
yield.  The idea is to ensure that permanent crops such as grapes cannot expand 
from year to year, given that this would require significant capital investment which is 
only possible in the long-run.  
A non linear programming structure is used to address the nonlinearities 
involved in the agricultural activities’ production functions as well as multiplication of 
two variables (i.e. net return per hectare and irrigation area under each crop and 
region) in calculation of total expected mean annual net return from each crop in 
each region.  The model has been coded in the modelling language of the General 
Algebraic Modelling System (Brooke et al., 2004) and a complete mathematical 
description of the modelling framework is provided by Qureshi et al., (2007).   
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MODEL RESULTS  
In the model, it is assumed that the water usage is equal to the stochastic water 
allocated to or available for that region.
12  A baseline application involves a set of 
simulations structured to assess the economic rent to investigate water demand, 
economic return and crop mix changes that could be expected across catchments. 
Initially in the analysis, only intraregional trade is allowed (where irrigators can only 
sell to/buy from other irrigators in the same region) and optimal land and water use is 
determined and a comparison is made with the given land and water for each 
catchment.  
Total expected water available for irrigation use in the whole Basin after 
deducting about 25% for the conveyance losses from total diverted water (8400 GL) 
is estimated to be at 6257 GL.
13  When only intraregional water trading is allowed, 
the water utilised by irrigation is also estimated to be 6257 GL while total expected 
net return is estimated at $2502 million (see Table 1).  This means all the 
catchments fully utilized their expected allocated/given water.  The Murrumbidgee 
remains the highest water user followed by the Murray River and the Goulburn.  The 
shadow prices of irrigation water in the Mallee, Wimmera-Avon and Lower Murray 
are $156, $120 and $117 per ML, respectively.  Net expected return per hectare and 
per ML is also highest in these three catchments.   
                                                 
12  Water charges, charging strategies, and rules for security of supply all differ from region to region, 
and are under review in response to water reform.  Heaney et al. (2004) sourced current water 
charges (including fixed fee and variable fee) applicable in nine irrigation regions by the relevant 
authorities.  These water charges are used for the catchments where these irrigation areas are 
located and for the remaining four catchments water charges similar to their adjacent catchments are 
used in the analysis.  
13  The Murray Darling Basin Commission has demonstrated that for the Basin as a whole, 25% of 
diversions for irrigation are lost during conveyance in rivers, 15% are lost from canals and 24% lost on 
farm, meaning that only 36% of irrigation water is actually delivered to plants (Charters and Williams, 
2006).  According to Khan et al. (2004), the current irrigation efficiencies vary across the Murray-
Darling Basin and total losses from a given channel can be up to 30% of the diverted water.  A 25% 
conveyance loss is used in the current analysis.  This means only 75% of the volume (8400 GL) of 
water diverted (or 6257 GL) is available for irrigation. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The weighted average shadow price of irrigation water in the Basin is also 
estimated by multiplying the proportion of water use in each catchment by each 
catchment’s shadow price and adding them together.  The expected weighted 
average shadow price of water in the Basin varies from $42 to $21 per ML indicating 
that irrigators in the Basin are willing to pay up to $42 per ML when they face 
extremely low water allocations compared to the state of nature when there are very 
high allocations and irrigators are not willing to pay more than $21 per ML.  These 
figures also indicate the willingness of irrigators in the Basin to pay higher premiums 
for more secure water.  
MODEL BASED POLICY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This study aims to estimate the cost of interregional water trade restrictions across 
the catchments and their impact on the Basin’s expected mean annual net return.  
The model is used to examine the impacts under five scenarios: 
a.  Baseline run when water trading is allowed across the Basin catchments 
without any institutional/administrative constraints or financial disincentives or 
exchange rate mechanism except an upper limit on maximum water trade-in 
allowed;
14 
b.  Water trading is allowed across the Basin catchments but irrigators in Victoria 
can sell up to 30% of their water allocation while irrigators in Murrumbidgee can 
sell up to 75% of their allocation along with an upper limit on the maximum 
water trade-in allowed;
  all administrative/application, irrigation authority and 
state fees and charges on water trading are applicable along with water 
exchange rate mechanism; 
                                                 
14  The maximum upper limit is imposed on water trading to address the channel capacity constraint.   
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c.  Water trading is allowed only in Victoria and NSW catchments.  The Victorian 
irrigators can sell up to 30% of their water allocation while irrigators in the 
Murrumbidgee catchment can sell up to 75% of their allocation.  All 
administrative/application, irrigation authority and state fees and charges on 
water trading are applicable along with an upper limit on maximum water trade-
in allowed; 
d.  Water trading is allowed only in Victoria and South Australia catchments.  The 
Victorian irrigators can sell up to 30% of their water allocation.  All 
administrative/application, irrigation authority and state fees and charges on 
water trading are applicable along with an upper limit on the maximum water 
trade-in allowed;
 and 
e.  Water trading is allowed only in South Australia and NSW catchments.  
Irrigators in the Murrumbidgee catchment can sell up to 75% of their allocation. 
All administrative/ application, irrigation authority and state fees and charges on 
water trading are applicable along with an upper limit on maximum water trade-
in allowed.
  
Scenarios B to E are compared against Scenario A and costs of the additional 
restrictions in each scenario are estimated.  In the baseline policy run Scenario A, 
total expected water use in the whole Basin remains the same, i.e. 6257 GL while 
total expected net return is estimated at $2590 million (a gain of $88 million as a 
result of interregional water trading) (see Table 2).  As a result of water trading, the 
results indicate that the Ovens, Avoca, Murray River, Mallee and Lower Murray 
catchments increase significantly their water usage while Broken and Goulburn 
reduce their water usage by 25% and 40%, respectively.  Because the three 
catchments of the Upper Murray, Kiewa and Wimmera-Avon are not part of the 
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trading system, their water usage remains the same as before trading along with 
their economic contribution towards total expected net return of the Basin.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The model is then used to estimate the impact under Scenarios B and C (see 
Table 3).  Depending on the economic performance and size of a catchment, the 
volume of transactions varies across the catchments.  A negative figure indicates 
that a region traded-out water while a positive figure indicates that a region traded-in 
water.  The results of three scenarios indicate that the transaction took place in all 
the catchments in Scenarios A and B.  The Lower Murray catchment did not 
participate in Scenario C because of the exclusion of SA and resulted in zero trade.  
Similarly, the two catchments of NSW did not participate in Scenario D while the 
seven catchments of Victoria did not participate in Scenario E and resulted in zero 
trade.  The maximum allowable water that can be traded in a region remains in the 
model which forces a region to trade only up to the threshold no matter how much 
irrigators in that region are willing to pay for an additional unit of water.  The 
expected volume of water traded in these scenarios varies between 341 GL to 546 
GL.  The volume of water traded is lower than the intrastate trading volumes but 
close to the interstate trading volumes (see Figure 2).   
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The historical size of transaction in the trading regions by individual irrigators 
varies between zero to hundreds or thousands of megalitres.
15  Following the local 
                                                 
15  Young et al. (2000) estimated volume of permanent trades from the commencement of the 
interstate trading trial by origin and destination and found that 51 trades took place and a total of 9.8 
GL of water was traded.  These figures indicate that on average across the Basin the amount of water 
traded was about 185 ML per trade.  As far as the temporary or seasonal water trading is concerned, 
the size of transactions was much smaller.  According to the Murray Irrigation Limited, the average 
size of a transaction in the region was 145 ML while in the Goulburn Murray water trading regions, the 
average size of a transaction was about 20 ML. 
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water trading observations, a conservative size of 20 ML per transaction is 
considered appropriate and used to estimate the number of transactions in each 
scenario, as shown in Table 4.  After determining optimal water usage and the 
number of transactions that took place in each catchment, the costs of water trading 
are included.  A post optimality analysis is carried out and expected mean annual net 
return is estimated for each catchment as well as impact on the total Basin expected 
mean annual net return for each scenario.  Table 4 also presents change in volume 
of water use and expected mean annual net return per ML of water in each 
catchment.  As far as water trading out is concerned, the Broken and Goulburn are 
the two catchments that lose a significant portion of their water allocations while the 
Murray-Riverina, Malle and Lower Murray catchments trade in water significantly in 
all three scenarios, except Lower Murray in the case of Scenario C where it does not 
participate in water trading.  The expected mean annual net return per ML of the 
regions which increase their water usage resulted in lower net returns per ML.  For 
example, water usages of Broken and Goulburn have increased while their expected 
mean annual net return per ML has decreased from $456 and $540 to $454 and 
$468, respectively.  Similarly, the expected mean annual net return of Lower Murray 
has increased from $1082 and $1088 in Scenarios D and B to $1388 in Scenario C 
when this region was not allowed to take part in water trading.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Basin-wide net returns are also estimated to examine impact of regulatory 
regimes and financial disincentives under each scenario, as shown in Table 5.  Due 
to the imposition of the upper limit on water trading in a region and inclusion of 
exchange fees and charges, net return has reduced from $2590 million in Scenario A 
to $2573 million in Scenario B, $2563 million in Scenario C, $2559 million in 
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Scenario D and $2528 million in Scenario E.  The opportunity cost of all these 
restrictions is $17 million in Scenario B, $27 million in Scenario C, $31 million in 
Scenario D and $63 million in Scenario E.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Comparing the last three scenarios (C, D and E, in each case one of the three 
states is excluded from the trading market) with Scenario B (where all three states 
participated in the market), the figures indicate that exclusion of the Lower Murray 
catchment costs $10 million.  These costs increased to $14 million and $46 million 
when first NSW catchments and then Victorian catchments are excluded from the 
water market.  Other than the impact of administrative and regulatory constraints, the 
individual impact of exchange fees and charges are also estimated for these 
scenarios which are $16.34 million, $11.26 million, $5.05 million and $6.06 million, 
respectively. 
The estimated gains ($88 million) as a result of interregional trade in Scenario 
A are about 4% of total net returns of the Basin.  These gains are slightly lower than 
the gains estimated by Hall et al., 1994) who found that unrestricted trade in water 
between all regions in the southern MDB increased gross margins by about 48 
million in aggregate, an increase of 4.6%.  However, the water trading gains in the 
current analysis are lower than the gains ($555 million in dry year and $201 million in 
wet year) reported in a recent study on free trade in the Basin (Peterson et al., 
2004).  This is due to a number of reasons.  For example, the current study assumed 
that in the base case intra-regional trade exists but Peterson et al (2004) estimated 
water trading gains when there was neither intra nor interregional trading in the base 
case.  Further, the current study adopted a partial analysis approach rather than a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling approach adopted in the previous 
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study where impacts on other industries and sectors were also linked and included.  
In addition, the current study is a short term analysis and estimates expected gains 
as a result of variation in rainfall and water allocations and any new investment is not 
allowed.  It is noted that the estimates of the costs due to restrictions, exchange 
rates and charges and gains as a result of free trade are for one year only and 
removal of these restrictions will result in further gains over the years ahead.  
Recent drought in the Basin resulted in a significant reduction in water 
allocations across the Basin.  In some regions, water allocations reduced by 40% to 
60% depending on the local water institutional arrangements and the proportion of 
low and high security water entitlements.  The model is also used to estimate impact 
of about 40% reduction in the expected water allocations across the Basin.
16  Basin-
wide new net returns reduced from $2502 million to $2097 million, (i.e. a reduction of 
about $405 million) while trading in a very dry year has increased net revenue to 
$2296 million, (i.e. a gain of $196 million).  This means water trading in a dry year 
compared to an expected year has increased net economic gains from 4% to about 
9% of Basin net revenue.  It is to be noted that many gains will come from 
permanent water trading and investment in new industries which is not included in 
this model.  Also the incorporation of other sectors and/or regions utilising a CGE 
model may increase the gains of water trading by estimating impacts on regional and 
national economies.  On contrary if agricultural adaptation takes place and irrigators 
become efficient in every trading region and maximise the value of water productivity 
then less water will be available for sale and less gains from expected trading.  
                                                 
16  Reduced water allocations with the existing minimum land constraint on individual activities made 
the model infeasible.  An adjustment in the minimum land constraint on individual activities was made 
to make the model feasible and to examine the impact of reduced water allocations.    
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Further, it is noted that water trading has the potential to create both positive 
and negative externality impacts (Etchells et al., 2006).  Water trade affects return 
flows that, in turn, affect the quantity and quality of water used downstream.  The 
impact of return flows on water quality is location specific.  The extent to which return 
flows affect water quality depends on a number of factors including groundwater 
recharge rates and the groundwater salinity underlying the irrigation areas.  Trade 
that moves water from an irrigation area with relatively low recharge rates and low 
groundwater salinity to a downstream irrigation area with high recharge rates and 
high groundwater salinity can produce a series of impacts on water quality (including 
salinity impact).  Consideration of these impacts is important in water policy 
development.  For example, Qureshi et al. (2007) accounted for the impact of water 
trading on salinity and estimated costs and benefits of water trading in both exporting 
and importing regions and found that despite negative impacts of water trading in the 
form of salinity, high water trading gains compared to water trading losses.   
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper, an optimization model is used to estimate the expected economic 
value of irrigated water for each agricultural activity in the Murray Basin.  The model 
provides estimates of the costs of water trade along with the costs of institutional and 
administrative constraints, financial disincentives and spatial restrictions as well as a 
restriction on maximum allowable water for trading in each region across the Basin.  
The model results indicate that the framework can provide robust information about 
the cost of temporary water trading restrictions to inform policy makers in dealing 
with water management issues.  
It is important to recognise that despite progress in the water markets (though 
mainly in the temporary trading) there are still some barriers and restrictions in 
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proper functioning of water markets.  As a result, variable opportunity costs of 
different options on removing market barriers need to be carefully considered before 
making a decision.  For example, in the process of negotiating an interregional water 
trading agreement, from the southern MDB perspective, it would be economically 
important to incorporate Victoria in the agreement as the opportunity cost of Victoria 
not participating in a water market is the highest followed by New South Wales and 
South Australia.   
The analysis in this study demonstrates that including expected rainfall and 
water allocation is suited to exploring general bounds and most likely outcomes of 
decision making under a wide range of conditions and is thus well suited to policy 
development.  The intent in the future is to further develop and use this modelling 
capacity to, amongst other things, test the efficacy of alternative decision making 
strategies for water management.  The size of water trading transactions is critical in 
estimating total cost.  It is planned to extend the analysis to account for varying size 
of water transactions.  It is also planned to examine the impact of a constant water 
charging regime on water trading across the catchments.   
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Upper Murray  100  20412  10  5375  944  263 
Kiewa 100  3543  14  859  919  243 
Ovens 100  14768  20  11617  1472  787 
Broken 100  654248  9  232701  2064  356 
Goulburn 100  840427  6  287120 2388  342 
Campaspe 100  132001  12  58529  1949  443 
Loddon 100  799605  12  245081  1212  307 
Avoca 98  104537  22  77036  3440  737 
Murray-
Riverina 
80 853084  32  190114  865  219 
Murrumbidgee 100  2271415  12  430350  1379 189 
Mallee 97  346583  156  660807  9719  1906 
Wimmera-
Avon 
89 31900  120  46133 9308  1445 
Lower Murray  74  184335  117  256383  9645  1388 
Total   6256858    2502105    
 
*   In the case of Avoca, Mallee, Wimmera-Avon and Lower Murray, both irrigated and dryland 
revenues are included because these catchments released some portion of their irrigated land 
towards dryland 
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Table 2.  Region expected irrigated land/water use and net return of water usage 


















Upper Murray  100  20412  20412  100  5375  944  263 
Kiewa 100  3543  3543  100  859  919  243 
Ovens 100  14768  20675  140  12130  1537  587 
Broken 100  654248  490883  75  223825  1986  456 
Goulburn 100  840427  503336  60  271942  2261  540 
Campaspe 100  132001  134457  102  58610  1952  436 
Loddon 100  799605  778004  97  243273  1203  313 
Avoca 100  104537  129791  124  79101  3473  609 
Murray-
Riverina 
96 853084  1194318 140  234441  899  196 
Murrumbidgee 100  2271415  2247180 99  430968  1381  192 
Mallee 99  346583  452082  130  707891  10144  1566 
Wimmera-
Avon 
89 31900  31900  100  46133  9308  1445 
Lower Murray  87  184335  250275  136  275574  8896  1100 
Total   6256858  6256856   2590122    
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transfers out















Ovens 5907  5907  5907  5907  0 
Broken -163365  -164085  -152054  -89082  0 
Goulburn -337091  -252128  -252128  -252128  0 
Campaspe 2457 -3663  -659  21082  0 
Loddon -21600  -48464  -28350  107076 0 
Avoca 25254  22198  23995  29779  0 
Murray-
Riverina 341234  341234  341234  0  299362 
Murrumbidgee -24235  -70665  -43432  0  -351304 
Mallee 105500  105121  105487  106957  0 
Lower Murray  65940  64545  0  70409  51942 
Total 546292  539005  476623  341210  351304 M.E. Qureshi, T. Shi, S. Qureshi, W. Proctor and M. Kirby
 
Table 4.  Expected change in water usage (proportion), number of transactions and net returns in major trading regions 
in each scenario 
Costless unrestricted trade 
Scenario A 
Trading Fees and limits on 
transfers out Scenario B 
SA excluded from interstate 


























Broken  -25 -8168 456  -25 -8204  454  -23 -7603  445 
Goulburn  -40  -16855  540  -30  -12606 468 -30  -12606 468 
Campaspe 2  123  436  -3  -183  453  0  -33  444 
Loddon  -3 -1080  313  -6 -2423  321  -4 -1418  314 
Avoca  24 1263  609  21 1110  620  23 1200  612 
Murray-Riverina 40 17062  196  40 17062  191  40 17062  191 
Murrumbidgee  -1 -1212  192  -3 -3533  194  -2 -2172  193 
Mallee  30 5275  1566  30 5256  1564  30 5274  1562 
Lower Murray  36  3297  1100  35  3227  1088  0  0  1388 
 
NSW excluded from interstate 
trade Scenario D 
Vic excluded from interstate 


















Broken -14  -4454  402  0  0  356 
Goulburn -3  -12606  468  0  0  342 
Campaspe 16  1054  390  0  0  443 
Loddon 13  5354  277  0  0  307 
Avoca 28  1489  589  0  0  737 
Murray-Riverina 0  0  219  35  14968  192 
Murrumbidgee 0  0 189  -15  -17565  211 
Mallee 31  5348  1557  0  0  1906 
Lower Murray  38  3520  1082  28  2597  1161 
Net return in Scenario A shows average return per ML without including transaction costs related to water trading..
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Net return (000$)  2590120  2573113  2563138  2559111  2527544 
Opportunity cost (000$)  0  17007  26983  31010  62576 
Cost of exchange fees 
and charges (000$)  0 16342  11264  5052  6057 
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